With the increasing awareness of environmental protection among consumers, green products are increasingly favored by the general public. The rapid development of e-commerce has increased the channels for consumers to contact and purchase green products. In this paper, consumers' perceived differences in product greenness among different channels are considered and three models of manufacturer-dominated Stackelberg game, retailer-dominated Stackelberg game and Nash equilibrium with equal power are constructed based on the difference pricing between online and offline channels. Also, the results of dual-channel structure are compared with those of single-channel respectively. The results show that when the green R & D costs are relatively high, manufacturers and retailers are motivated to compete as channel leaders, but for the entire supply chain, Nash's decision-making can improve product greenness and profitability of the supply chain. When green R & D costs are low, manufacturers' profits are higher under asymmetric power supply chains and lowest under vertical Nash decisions. Under the three kinds of power structure, product greenness and manufacturer's profit are higher than single channel under dual-channel structure. The comparison of retailer's profit in dual channel and single channel depends on green R & D costs.
Introduction
In recent years, the rapid development of e-commerce has triggered a boom in online shopping for all people. In order to encourage the consumption of green products, the industrial green development plan (2016) (2017) (2018) (2019) (2020) proposes to pro-Journal of Service Science and Management ronmental coordination and economic rationality [3] . According to these three characteristics, he established a system based on product greenness evaluation index system. Tao (2005) applied Life Cycle Inventory Analysis (LCIA), combined with the fuzzy evaluation theory and the green attribute of the product, constructed the step of evaluating the green degree of the product and the fuzzy evaluation matrix, and analyzed the application of the evaluation method [4] .
Zhang et al. (2008) put forward a dynamic comprehensive evaluation model based on the entropy weight method, which is suitable for weighing different advantages. He determined the weight of the index according to the degree of variation of each index value and overcomes the limitation of the lack of flexibility in the evaluation due to the fixed weights existing in the past green product evaluation process [5] .
As the green degree of products gets more and more attention from the consumers, the enterprises enhance the competitiveness of the enterprises by improving the green degree of the products. The process from the raw materials to the final finished products involves the whole supply chain. Therefore, it has become an important direction of academic research that considering the greenness in the entire supply chain. The predecessors mainly studied the power structure of green supply chain and the competition of green supply chain. In the area of power structure, Ghosh (2012) further analyzed the effects of the three channel structures of manufacturer-led, retailer-led and vertical Nash on their respective profit and decision variables based on the supply chain consisting of a single retailer and a single manufacturer, and compared the influence of retailer-manufacturer joint decision-making green degree and decentralized decision-making product greenness on supply chain profit and decision variable [6] . Later, he considered both centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making, and validated the existence of dual marginal effects and coordinated cost-sharing benefits among members of the supply chain [7] . Based on this, Jiang Shi Ying (2015) , a domestic scholar, added green marketing costs and green utility to study the impact of different power structures on product greenness, product prices and wholesale price [8] . In the competition of green supply chain, Yu et al. (2016) established a green supply chain game model consisting of two manufacturers with a different green level and a retailer under the background of the government providing green subsidies, and found that the Product greenness and the level of government subsidies can be balanced solution [9] .
Li et al. (2016) established a two-channel competition green supply chain game model, manufacturers can sell products either through retailers or direct sales channels through online channels, studies have shown that when the cost of green manufacturing is above a certain threshold , The manufacturer will not open the direct sales channel. When the consumer's loyalty to the retail channel and the green manufacturing cost satisfy certain relations, the dual-channel green supply chain exists [10] . They explored the issue of endogenous selection of channels in green supply chains, which is much more instructive than the Journal of Service Science and Management previous study of dual choice of firms as a fait accompli, but they considered only the predominance of manufacturers. Jamali et al. (2017) established a two-channel competition model between green and non-green supply chains, and analyzed and compared the intensity of price competition between channels.
The effect of greenness on demand on sales price, product greenness and the impact of supply chain members' profits [11] .
In the field of power structure of dual-channel supply chains, Zhang et al. (2012) analyzed the impact of product substitutability and channel position on pricing decisions in an exclusive dual-channel supply chain under different market structures. Their results show that vertical Nash equilibrium can be balanced for supply chain members, and that the structure of balanced supply of suppliers and retailers is the best for the entire supply chain [12] . Lu and Liu (2013) studied the pricing game in a hybrid two-channel distribution system where both physical retailers and online retailers coexist, the results show that the performance of both suppliers and retailers is influenced by different market structures [13] . Shi et al. (2013) used the supplier Stackelberg, retailer Stackelberg and Nash game to construct a supply chain market structure model under uncertain demand. Studies show that only when the demand is linear rather than the expected elasticity, Companies can profit when they are in a dominant position [14] . Chen et al. (2015) studied the optimal pricing and channel selection strategies for handset manufacturers under different channel powers based on the game theory model when the two purchase channels of smart phone industry, bare metal [15] . Zhang et al. (2015) built the Stackelberg game dominated by manufacturers and retailers and the Nash game model with equal power based on the differences in the power of members in the dual-channel supply chain.
The study found that both manufacturers and retailers are willing to give up power and would rather do Stackelberg game followers, and Nash game is always the game player's strict best practices [16] . Li et al. (2017) also considered the influence of channel spillover and service negative spillover effects on the decision-making of the two-channel supply chain. The service level, wholesale price, retail price and dual-channel performance were compared under different channel forces. Under the influence of different channels, the changes of total supply chain performance, direct channel performance and traditional channel performance mainly depend on the service negative spillover coefficient and the potential market share of direct channels [17] .
Through the research on green products, green supply chain management and dual-channel supply chain, we find that previous researches on green products and green supply chain have been enriched. A large number of scholars have made great achievements in the evaluation system of green products. Beneficial exploration, more scholars have studied the competition between multiple manufacturers or multiple retailers in the green supply chain offline channels. More scholars on the status quo of dual-channel research are based on the differences between online and offline channels. A few scholars study dual-channel green Y.-M. Xu, P. Zhang Journal of Service Science and Management supply chain decisions that consider the greenness of products such as Li (2016) [10] and Jamali (2017) [11] . They are highly instructive based on the premise that manufacturers are dominant and consistent in price both online and offline.
In general, there are two shortages: 1) in the actual scenario, the power structure of different dual-channel supply chains is different. At present, some scholars have studied the dual-channel green supply chain with the dominant manufacturer, few scholars study the dominant position of retailers and the competition between the two sides under the dual-channel green supply chain and few scholars compare the three different power structures analysis; 2) Some scholars have considered the situation where manufacturers and retailers make unified pricing for online and offline channels. There are few scholars to investigate the differences between manufacturer and retailer for different pricing of green products in different channels.
On the one hand, this article takes into account the peculiar attributes of green products and consumers' perception of the green degree of products (the degree of energy-saving and emission-reducing of green products and the degree of harm to the human body and the environment) between traditional offline retail stores and online shopping centers to study the impact of this phenomenon on the research and development and production of green products. On the other hand, this article considers that different manufacturers and retailers may be in different market structures and studies the influence of different market structures on R & D, production and marketing of green products.
The Model
This paper considers a two-channel green supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer in the supply chain, manufacturers have an online direct sales channel, and retailers have offline channels. In order to protect the environment and enhance market competitiveness, manufacturers will invest a certain amount of green research and development costs to produce a green product.
Consumers may select offline retail stores to purchase products according to their shopping preferences, or they may choose to purchase products through the online channels.
The notations used in this article are in Table 1 .
For the sake of analysis, the following assumptions were made: 1) Market demand is a linear function of sales price and product greenness, and is negatively correlated with sales price and positively correlated with product greenness. According to the study of Li (2016) [10] , it is assumed that the market demand in offline and offline channels are positive, the demand func- 2) The production of green products will not change the manufacturer's Y.-M. Xu, P. Zhang Journal of Service Science and Management 3) Consumers can perceive the greenness of their products more truthfully through tactile, audible and sales staff explanations through offline retail channels. Therefore, the products with the same greenness have a greater impact on consumers through the offline retail channels than online channel [10] , that is to see 1 m r β β < < .
4) The influence of cross price elasticity of elasticity on demand is less than the impact of its own channel price on demand, that is 1 b < . 5) To prevent retailers from purchasing goods from online sources, suppose that manufacturers' wholesale prices of online retail channels are lower than the direct sales prices of online channels. Through the above model description and basic assumptions, we can get the profit function of the manufacturer: In order to make the function have the optimal solution, construct the Hessian matrix: 
Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) Model
Under the manufacturer-led dual-channel green supply chain model, manufacturers can sell green products through off-line channels and online channels.
The game sequence of the model is that the manufacturer first determines the greenness of the green product θ , the wholesale price w and the sales price of the online direct sales channel m p , and then the retailer decides the price of the green product of the offline channel r p .
Adopting the method of reverse induction, the derivative function of the retailer is first evaluated as r p derivative and a value of 0 is obtained. 
Retailer Stackelberg (RS) Model
In the current market, more and more offline retailers, such as Wal-Mart, Carrefour, GOME and Suning, are emerging in the current market. Increasingly, 
Vertical Nash (VN) Model
In addition to the domination of manufacturers and the predominance of retailers, the reality is that there is still a close match between the two sides. More and more large offline retailers, such as Wal-Mart, Carrefour, GOME and Suning, Through the above solution, we can find the optimal equilibrium solution and profit under the domination of manufacturer, retailer-led and Nash respectively.
The Results of Single-Channel
The results are shown in Table 2 .
Comparative Analysis of the Results under Different Power Structure
In this section, we conduct a comparative analysis of the equilibrium solutions, market demands and profits obtained under different power structures in the previous section. The purpose of this section is to explore the impact of different power structures on the decisions of the dual-channel green supply chain and the profits of the supply chain and the efficiency of the entire supply chain.
Proposition 5-1: Optimal product greenness under different power structures satisfy the following: under the line and the lowest green degree in MS mode has also led to the offline retail sales lowest price when green research and development costs are high, the offline retail price is the highest in MS mode, followed by RS mode, then VN mode, and finally the centralized decision mode. This is because the cost is too high, the difference of green degree is less under centralized and decentralized decision, and the effect of eliminating double marginal effect is greater than that of cost difference. Therefore, the retail price under centralized decision is the lowest. When the manufacturer is dominant, the highest price wholesale led to the highest offline retail price. At this time, both sides can evenly reduce the competition and improve the efficiency of the entire supply chain.
Numerical Experiments

A Comparative Study of Different Power Structures
In order to intuitively indicate the size relationship between the online and offline demand under different power structure and the supply chain node enterprise profit, we make a two-dimensional map.
From Figure 1 , we can see that when the manufacturer is dominant, the demand for offline is the lowest and the highest is for centralized decision. The relationship between retailer's dominant and Nash's decision size depends on the Y.-M. Xu, P. Zhang is larger, the manufacturer has the highest online demand when the manufacturer is in the dominant position. This shows that the dominant manufacturer will maximize the online demand at this time, we can also see that the demand for centralized decision-making is the lowest at this moment, which shows that the increase of green research and development cost will force manufacturers to take actions that are not good for the whole supply chain efficiency.
From 
Single-Channel and Dual-Channel Comparative Analysis
This section examines the differences and changes in product greenness, selling prices, and profits for both manufacturers and retailers in a single-channel and preferences for online channels increase. Therefore, for manufacturers, the sooner the online sales are conducted, the less susceptible they are to traditional retailers. Consumers' online shopping habits are a gradual process and taking into account that e-commerce has become a long-term development trend, the earlier opening of e-channels by manufacturers not only complies with this trend but also gives retailers more time to adapt to changes in the competitive environment, which is conducive to the healthy development of the supply chain.
Recommendations of the Comparative Analysis
We can get some management enlightenment from the comparative analysis of the above two parts. First, the manufacturers are inspired by the fact that they 
